Under New Strategy of Electric Power System Reformation (NSEPSR), an electricity retailer decides its level of involvement in the contract market and in the spot market as well as the selling price offered to its clients with the goal of maximizing the expected profit at its acceptable risk level. Under time-of-use pricing, users will adjust their needs according to the price changes. How to determine the time-of-use electricity price and the power purchase strategy in the contract market and in the spot market while accounting for the profit of the retailer and users becomes an important topic. Based on the above reasons, this paper formulates the optimal pricing and dispatch problem of an electricity retailer as a bilevel programming model, in which the upper level maximizes the retailer's benefit, while the lower level minimizes the cost of each electricity user. The model is transformed into a mixed integer linear program by jointly using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality condition as well as the duality theorem of linear programming. Finally, a case is studied to analyze effect of risk preference and market price volatility on electricity retailer profit. The result can provide reference for the electricity retailer to make the purchase and sale strategy. ________________________
INTRODUCTION
In the free electricity retailing market, the business of a retailer includes selling electricity and other value-added services, in which the selling of electricity is the core business. At present, domestic and foreign research on electricity retailers focuses on electricity buying and selling strategies and their operating modes. As for retailers' operating modes, paper [1] [2] analyzed the classification of electricity retailers and their way of buying and selling electricity in the background of new electricity reform, and put forward the model of retailers' service business.
In the research aspect of retailers' electricity buying and selling strategies, paper [3] [4] [5] established a stochastic programming model which analyzed the electricity buying proportion of an electricity retailer in the contract market and the power pool under the time-of-use electricity price of the user side, and obtained the optimal time-of use electricity price. Paper [6] proposed an optimized trading strategy for the sale of an electricity retailer in the balanced market, which included intermittent load and key load pricing. In paper [7] , based on the uniform electricity price and the closed-end time-of-use prices, taking into account the effectiveness of the interruptible load, the electricity supply contract selection model was established based on the Logit theory. Paper [8] [9] studied the sale strategy and risk management of an electricity retailer considering the price elasticity of user demand.
In the above study, the demand price elasticity coefficient was used to describe the response of user's electricity demand to price change. This description was too simple to view the market participation of user with the goal of minimizing the cost of electricity. In addition, previous studies often view all users as the same type of pricing, and there was no specific distinction between industrial, commercial, and residential users, such pricing was not reasonable.
In view of the above problems, this paper puts forward the time-of-use electricity price and power purchasing strategy of an electricity retailer considering user's response. Using bilevel planning model, the stochastic model which optimize the time-of-use price and electricity purchase is established, in which the upper level maximizes retailer's profits and CVaR and the lower level minimizes users' cost. The users are divided into three categories of industrial, commercial and residential. By using KKT optimal condition and duality theorem of linear programming, the bilevel model can be transformed into a mixed integer linear programming to obtain the optimal time-of-use electricity price and power purchase strategy. skip the retailer and directly buy electricity from power generation company [10] [11] . The operating modes of an electricity retailer are as follows:
1) Long-term bilateral contract based mode: Predict users' load, and sign a longterm bilateral trading contract with power generation companies. The contract includes the capacity and price of electricity for each period of time.
2) Time-of-Use (TOU) price based mode: The retailer determines the time-of use electricity prices, and users adjust their electricity consuming strategy according to time-of use electricity prices.
3) Spot market based mode: The retailer buys or sells the deviation electricity in spot market.
Under the above framework, the key issue that an electricity retailer need to address is to determine the time-of-use electricity prices for each period. The profits of the electricity retailer depend on users' electricity consumption at all times, and users' electricity consuming strategy is adjusted according to time-of-use electricity prices determined by the retailer.
Bilateral Contract Model
Assume that the electricity retailer signs an ordinary bilateral contract with power generation companies to purchase electricity. Ordinary bilateral contracts use a pricing system similar to time-of-use electricity price system, that is, develop a different contract price according to the different power delivery time [12] . In this paper, we use the ordinary bilateral contract which includes peak, flat, valley three pricing period. The pricing system is as follows:
In the formula, t  is the contract price of the bilateral contract during period t. h  , m  , l  are the contract prices for the peak, flat, and valley period. h t , m t , l t are the time period for the peak, flat, valley period. In particular, .
Dealing with Parameters Uncertainty
The spot price is the main uncertainty faced by electricity retailers, and is represented by random variables in this paper. As the spot price has a certain random distribution law, we use Monte Carlo method to extract the sample points according to its distribution law, simulating the scenario information of the spot market price, and then turn the stochastic programming problem into a deterministic planning problem. A specific scenario is:
is the purchasing price in spot market during period t in scenario ω, is the scene collection.
Stochastic planning actually consists of two stages: the first stage is hereand-now decision, that is, the decision is made before knowing the actual values of the random variables. The second stage is the wait-and-see decision, that is, making decisions after knowing the actual values of the random variables. In this paper, the decision to purchase electricity from bilateral contract and the determination of electricity selling price are in the first stage, and the decision to purchase and sell electricity in the spot market and the decision of users' electricity consumption in each period belong to the second stage. The scenario diagram of the retailer's trading decision is shown in Figure 1 . 
BILEVEL PLANNING MODEL
The retailer's trading decision is formulated as a two-layer bilevel planning model, where the decision maker of upper layer is the electricity retailer and that of the lower layer is the user. The model is structured as shown in Figure  2 .
Upper Layer Modelling
The upper level maximizes retailer's profits and CVaR.
PROFIT FUNCTION OF THE ELECTRICITY RETAILER
The profits of the retailer are made up of the proceeds from selling electricity to users and to spot market minus the costs of purchasing electricity from bilateral contract and spot market.
(1) Selling electricity to users
In period T, the proceed from selling electricity to the user set I (   1,2,3 I  respectively on behalf of the residents, commercial, and industrial users) is:
In the formula: is the probability of scenario ; is the price of the electricity sold to the user I during period t ; is the power consumption of the user i during period t.
(2) Purchasing electricity based on bilateral contract According to the forecast of the user load, the retailer will sign bilateral contracts with power generation companies to buy part of the electricity, thereby reducing the risk caused by the fluctuations of spot price. In period T, the cost of purchasing electricity from bilateral contract is:
In the formula:
is the contract price of the bilateral contract during period t; is power purchased from bilateral contract during period t. (3) Purchasing electricity from spot market The retailer buys the deviation electricity from spot market, the cost in period T is:
is the purchasing price in spot market during period t in scenario ω; is the power purchased from spot market during period t in scenario ω.
(4) Selling electricity to spot market The retailer sells the deviation electricity from spot market, the proceed in period T is:
is the selling price in spot market during period t in scenario ω; is the power sold to spot market during period t in scenario ω.
TRANSACTION RISK MODELING
In this paper, we use the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) to model the transaction risk. When maximizing a discrete profit distribution at α confidence level. CVaR can be defined approximately as the expected profit corresponding to the scenario set with a probability of with a lower profit [13] . CVaR can be transformed into the following linear optimization problem [14] .
In the formula: the optimization variable is the value-at-risk (VaR), which is the maximum profit value, so that the probability that the profit does not exceed is ; is the profit under scenario ; is the difference between VaR and the profit.
The objective function of the upper model consists of two parts, as shown in equation (9).
The first part is the profit of the electricity retailer, and the second part is the product of CVaR and a weight coefficient  . The value of the weight coefficient  is . When the retailer is regardless of the transaction risk, the retailer will set the  factor as 0. The greater the value of  grows, the higher the risk aversion degree the retailer has.
(2) Constraints Power balance constraint:
Power upper and lower bound:
In the formula: , are the upper and lower limits of the contracted power during period t; is the corresponding binary variable of scenario ; M is a sufficiently large positive number. Formula (12), (13) are used to limit that at most only one of and is strictly greater than 0: when , , when , . Price Constraints: In the formula:
, are the lowest and the highest electricity selling price to users; is the daily average electricity selling price. CVaR constraints:
Lower Layer Modeling
The lower level model minimizes users' cost.
(1) Objective function Lower decision makers are users, the target is to minimize the cost of electricity consumption:
(2) Constraints Daily electricity consumption constraints:
In the formula, and represent the minimum and maximum power consumption of user i.
Unit time power consumption constraints:
In the formula, and represent the lowest and highest power consumption of user i during period t.
PROBLEM SOLUTION
The model established in this paper is a bilevel mixed integer nonlinear stochastic programming model, in which the upper model consists of (9) -(17), the decision variables are , the lower model
consists of (18) -(20), and the decision variable is . The KKT condition and duality theorem can be used to transform the model into mixed integer linear programming [15] , and then the optimization problem can be solved by the general algebra modeling system (GAMS).
Replacing the lower-level optimization problem by its KKT condition, the constraint relation of the variables and can be obtained. The KKT condition for the lower model is:
In the formula: are the Lagrangian multipliers. (22) -(25) are complementary relaxation conditions, which mean that the multiplier corresponding to the non-functional constraint is required to be zero.
Introduce binary variables
to linearize (22) -(25): 
CASE STUDY

Input Parameters
We divide one day into 24 periods. Confidence level is set to 0.95. Refer to the actual selling price of the PJM market, set the upper limit for selling price to 71.5$/MW·h, the lower limit to 14$/MW·h, and the daily average selling price to 44.7$/MW·h. Assume that the spot market purchasing price is equal to the selling price, that is . The simulation of spot price is as follows: use a typical daily spot price in PJM market as a reference spot price. We refer to the spot price during period t as . Set the spot price of each period to obey the normal distribution ( ), using "3 " criterion, randomly generate a number of points in . In this study, the Monte Carlo method is used to generate 100 scenarios in each period, and the scenario reduction method was used to reduce the number of scenarios to 20. The bilateral contract prices and reference spot prices used in this example are shown in Figure 3 .
The typical daily load curve of winter in Shanghai is used as the forecast load curve. The upper and lower limits of the contract purchase power are set to 1.2 times and 0.8 times the predicted total load, respectively. In order to examine the user's response to the price, set the user daily electricity consumption and the original forecast load the same, that is , so that we can analyze the difference between the electricity consumption curve under time-of-use pricing and the original forecast load curve. Assume that industrial users have maximum demand elasticity, business users in the middle, and resident users minimum. Set the upper and lower limits of electricity consumption for industrial users at 1.3 times and 0.7 times of the original forecast load respectively; 1.2 times and 0.8 times for commercial users respectively; 1.1 times and 0.9 times for residential users respectively.
Results Analysis
(1) Ignoring risk When the retailer is risk neutral, that is, regardless of the transaction risk (β=0), the retailer's optimal trading strategy is shown in Table 1 . Figure 4 shows the comparison between the optimal electricity consumption strategy of the residents, the commercial and the industrial users and the original forecasted load curve.
As can be seen from Table 1 , when ignoring the risk, the electricity retailer will buy more electricity from bilateral contract and sell the deviation electricity in the spot market when the forecasted spot price is higher. When the forecasted spot price is lower, the retailer will buy less electricity from bilateral contract and buy the deviation electricity in the spot market. As can be seen from Table 1 and Figure 4 , the electricity retailer raises the power price in the peak period to guide users to reduce electricity consumption when the spot price is high. In contrast, the electricity retailer reduces the power price to guide users to increase electricity consumption when the spot price is low. Overall, for users with lower demand elasticity, their peak-valley difference of time-of-use price is greater than that of users with higher demand elasticity. It can be seen from Figure 4 , users adjust their power consumption from period with higher power price to period with lower price. So that we can see, time-of-use power price has played a certain role in peak load shifting. (1) Considering risk Taking the power price for commercial users as an example, analyze the time-of-use power price strategy of the electricity retailer under different risk factors. The time-of-use power prices for commercial users under different risk factors are shown in Figure 5 .
It can be seen from Figure 5 that, with the increase of risk aversion degree, the electricity retailer will adopt more conservative trading strategy. The peak price follows a downward trend, which will lead to the decline of the retailer's profits.
The profits of the retailer under different risk factors are shown in Figure 6 . As can be seen from Figure 6 , with the increase of the risk factor, the expect profit of the electricity retailer declines. This is because that, with the increase of risk aversion degree, the electricity retailer takes more conservative trading strategy, and thus the expect profit will get lower. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the optimization trading strategy of the electricity retailer considering users' response under the background of the new electricity reform. The conclusions are as follows:
1) Using bilevel planning model, in which the upper target is to maximize the retailer's profit and CVaR and the lower target is to minimize users' cost, we have got the optimal time-of-use electricity price and purchasing power distribution. The time-of-use electricity price strategy takes into account users' response to the price, which can realize the win-win of the retailer and users.
2) In the optimal time-of-use electricity price strategy, the electricity retailer raises the power price in the peak period to guide users to reduce electricity consumption when the spot price is high. In contrast, the electricity retailer reduces the power price to guide users to increase electricity consumption when the spot price is low. This strategy can play a certain role in peak load shifting, and is conducive to improving market efficiency.
3) The risk preference of the retailer will have an impact on its trading strategy. The higher the degree of risk aversion, the more conservative trading strategy the retailer will take, and the smaller expected profits it will get. Depending on the risk preference, the retailer can use a different trading strategy to maximize its own desired profit.
